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ABSTRACT
Th e stirring social and political events of the change of regime in 1989/1990 and 
the subsequent periods have had an extremely powerful eﬀ ect on the transfor-
mation of the Hungarian economy. Hungary entered the European order of 
market economy with partial monetisation, oversized industry, and neglected 
infrastructure. Th e economic policy thinking was dominated by worries about 
external indebtedness and by the intention of deﬁ nitively joining the western po-
litical system, while closing the gap between the income levels of Hungary and the 
developed West was in the focus of social expectations. Th e establishment of the 
institutional system of market economy and getting into the western order have 
eventually been successfully accomplished, yet income convergence has proved to 
be uneven and slow, which has led to widespread frustration. Th e ﬁ nancial crisis 
of 2008 exposed the risks arising from high degree of trade and ﬁ nancial open-
ness. As a joint result of unorthodox economic policies of the subsequent period 
and beneﬁ cial external conditions, Hungary’s external exposure has decreased 
to date. However, growing centralisation and the government’s pro-sovereignty 
policy will increase the frequency of conﬂ icts with EU institutions. Despite eco-
nomic policies to accelerate convergence, Hungary’s middle-income status has 
become permanent, strengthening external and internal migration and increas-
ing regional tensions in the country. Th e new phenomena of product and labour 
markets, as well as new technological trends will put Hungarian economic policy 
to test. Besides, adjustment tasks emanate from ongoing complex European pol-
icy changes. 
JEL codes: E02, E44, E60, F15, 43
Keywords: change of regime, institutions of the market economy, cooperation 
within CMEA, two-tier banking system, European integration, macroeconomic 
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1 HUNGARY’S PLACE: ON THE PERIPHERY OF EUROPE
1.1 Continuity in the midst of changes:
moderate development, higher ambition
Th e economic circumstances in Hungary have changed tremendously over three 
decades. In order to interpret them, we must leave the world of economic facts 
and data, acknowledging the importance of successive political changes. At the 
time of writing, even the map of Europe is diﬀ erent from that at the beginning of 
the period. In 1989, People’s Republic of Hungary was bordered by ﬁ ve neighbour-
ing countries, three of which (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union) 
were to cease to exist soon. In those days, Hungary was a member of the Warsaw 
Pact, an anti-NATO military association, and the CMEA, a production speciali-
sation organisation run by the Soviet Union. Soon aft er the political shift , both 
organisations were dissolved. Since then, Hungary has been part of the western 
order of alliances and the European integration. 
Th e development of all Central and Eastern European countries has been ex-
tremely powerfully determined by foreign politics and geopolitics. Yet, in social 
and economic aspects, the region had not become a homogeneous bloc even in the 
period of the Cold War. Aft er 1990, Central and Eastern European nations chose 
considerably diﬀ erent paths in economic and social policy, despite the fact that all 
of them had undergone intense institutional harmonisation as EU candidates and 
then as members. Still, Estonia, for instance, is markedly diﬀ erent from Romania, 
or Slovenia from Hungary. If one realizes the developmental and structural dif-
ferences and national features, it is easier to understand the paths taken by these 
countries and to predict the possible responses to the challenges of the present.
Th e path that one particular country has covered should not be evaluated on the 
basis of its own past, but rather on the basis of an objective benchmark: the per-
formance of other nations. However, it is not evident which framework is ad-
equate for the assessment of the Hungarian economic path and economic policy 
practice, beyond the fact that among other nations, Hungary is referred to as a 
post-communist society, a transitional country, and a former planned economy 
since the turn of 1989/1990. True, but the terms above also apply to the former 
German Democratic Republic, Serbia or Poland, yet only the last name is relevant 
for the interpretation of the three-decade-long path of the Hungarian economic 
policy. Th e benchmark cannot be chosen arbitrarily, nor can it be deduced ex-
clusively from objective indicators: the sentiments of the society should also be 
considered. Traditionally, the Hungarian public opinion has considered Austria 
or Germany as a benchmark. Even today, Hungarians hesitate to compare their 
country to Romania, though based on economic development and the leeway in 
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economic policy, it would be more relevant than using the historically under-
standable but unrealistic Austrian benchmark. 
Currently, based on the human development indicators (HDI) and macroeconomic 
data, market analysts and international organisations classify Hungary as a high 
HDI nation, an upper-medium income state, and an emerging economy. In geopo-
litical sense, the country belongs to the periphery of Europe. In this study, we accept 
the aforementioned categories and apply them to the three-decade-long path. 
1.2  Long lasting legacies of economic history
Compared to the then core countries, Hungarian capitalism had emerged fairly 
late. However, it is important to see that the Hungarian economy was not consid-
ered to be underdeveloped in the period of the emergence of capitalism. In the 19th 
century, Hungary’s development level diﬀ ered considerably from that of Western 
Europe, but the chances of convergence were not nil. Th e credit institution sec-
tor, the stock exchange, the integrated rail traﬃ  c system, the land and real prop-
erty cadastre, commercial and ﬁ nancial law and other important institutions of 
the capitalist order were well established even by the European standards of the 
era. A larger entity, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, served as a framework for 
market development. True, in terms of economic advancement, the Monarchy 
was lagging one step behind the western part of Europe, and its political evolution 
was also diﬀ erent in many respects, for example, it did not take part in colonisa-
tion overseas. At the same time, regarding access to technology, capital and mar-
ket, the Monarchy proved to be an inspiring integration framework for the Hun-
garian economy. Although the income level of the Hungarian Kingdom reached 
only two-thirds of the more developed provinces of the Monarchy, the economy 
was growing fast. Hungary has never had so high growth advantage over western 
neighbours since then, especially in the 30 years examined here.
Th e “golden period” was closed for good by the new conﬁ guration of European 
power relations in 1918. Between the two world wars, Hungary suﬀ ered social and 
economic shocks but regained politically sovereignty. Th e economy was relative-
ly well industrialised, but it strongly depended on German, Austrian and Ital-
ian markets, for political and structural reasons. Aft er the Second World War, 
Hungary was forced again to follow an inescapable path, and its sovereignty was 
limited, this time by the USSR. Th e path of the country’s reconstruction and 
modernisation was again restrained by external forces: Hungary drift ed into the 
Eastern bloc. Th e economic structure was determined by the single-party, repres-
sive political system and by decades of forced industrialisation based on the logic 
of the Cold War. 
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Th ese antecedents left  behind some consequence for the present. One particular 
point we should pay special attention to is a phenomenon that still permeates 
Hungarian social and economic policy: the desire to catch up with the West, and 
the obsession to compare things to those of Austria and Germany. Historically, 
it is understandable, but it fuels the permanent frustration of the Hungarian so-
ciety. While Eastern Europe, including Hungary, had previously became part of 
the sphere of interest of the Soviet Union, an economically less developed, milita-
rised power aft er 1945, Western European states had meanwhile chosen the path 
of integration, overcoming national divisions. During the 1960s and 70s, Austria 
and Germany reached an income level that surpassed even the rapidly growing 
West European average. Th us, the development gap between them and Hungary 
further increased in the second half of the 20th century. Th e former are, by global 
standards, core countries, while today’s Hungary is a peripheral country, just like 
it was in previous periods of economic history. 
In economic policy, particularly diﬃ  cult challenges have arisen since the middle 
of the 30-year-long period discussed here as the Hungarian state has had to cope 
with speciﬁ c problems caused by the peripheral position and being in emerging 
market status, but meanwhile at the same time Hungary has had to exploit the 
opportunities and fulﬁ l the obligations deriving from the country’s membership 
of EU, a socially and economically advanced entity. 
2 ECONOMIC POLICIES DURING THE CHANGE OF REGIME
2.1 Orderly political transition in 1989/1990 –
on the verge of economic collapse
In the region, the political sea-change of 1989–90 was directly caused by sudden 
shift s in geopolitical circumstances, but the state of the economy also signiﬁ -
cantly aﬀ ected the fate of the incumbent political regime and the manner of its 
change. By 1989, the state party (the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party) had 
realised that the long-standing accumulated structural problems, in particular 
the acute ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties, could not be solved within the existing institu-
tional and political framework, nor by means of customary reform/adjustment 
techniques. At the same time, the establishment party did not have the legitimacy 
to initiate a radical change. By the end of 1989, even the international ﬁ nancial 
liquidity of Hungary had become uncertain in the eyes of creditors and capital 
market partners. Hungary had been a member of and in a credit relationship with 
the IMF since 1982, but the relationship was badly aﬀ ected by the disclosure, at the 
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end of 1989, of data falsiﬁ cation (“misreporting”) which had been going on since 
Hungary’s entry into the organisation. 
Th e communist regime was driven to accept the constitutional claims of the uni-
ﬁ ed opposition, organized into a “round table” as the ﬁ nancial collapse seemed 
to be so close. Free elections were held in the spring of 1990. At the time, follow-
ing the break-up of the state party, the larger successor (the Hungarian Socialist 
Party) seemed to have a chance to win the relatively strongest position in the new 
Parliament. However, the political dynamics turned out to be diﬀ erent: the So-
cialists eventually obtained only 10 of the parliamentary seats, while there was 
a close contest for the pole position between the centre-right MDF (Hungarian 
Democratic Forum) and the politically left -liberal SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Dem-
ocrats). In April 1990, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, having won the rela-
tive majority, managed to form a government in coalition with the Independent 
Smallholders’ Party and the Christian Democrats, while the parliamentary op-
position consisted of the Alliance of Free Democrats, the then liberal-alternative 
FIDESZ (Alliance of Young Democrats) and the Hungarian Socialist Party. Per-
haps, it was in Hungary where the change of the political regime took place in the 
most orderly way in the whole region, putting aside the special case of Germany 
where the Eastern provinces got integrated into the West-German political, legal 
and economic system fast, and consequently, they became part of the European 
Economic Community without transition.
Th e Hungarian change of regime seemed to be successful not only compared to 
the increasing number of crises which suddenly developed in the region. Th e ef-
ﬁ ciency of the constitutional order was indicated by the regularity of the four-
yearly election cycles and the organised manner of appointing new Prime Min-
isters, either because of the death of the PM in oﬃ  ce (József Antall, †1993) or for 
political reasons (Péter Medgyessy, 2004; Ferenc Gyurcsány, 2009). On the whole, 
the Hungarian constitutional order was an advantage for economic development. 
However, the same cannot be said of the economic structure that democratic 
Hungary inherited in 1990. Despite favourable international opinion and the ex-
pectations of the Hungarian public, it did not prove to be better than the eco-
nomic structures in other countries of the region. Th e structural problems had 
been partly known to the decision-makers, and, to some extent, to the general 
public. Still other aspects were being revealed gradually during the process of 
regime change. One fact was known: although the economic policy stage of “the 
country of iron and steel” dates back to the ﬁ rst half of state socialism, that is to 
the 1950s, yet despite all subsequent reforms, the heavy industry, heavy chemistry, 
mining and the armaments industry which were left  behind remained massively 
oversized. Such a legacy would have called for a kind of regional and sectoral 
crisis management exercise that was applied in Western Europe in the 1970s, de-
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manding vast resources.. However, similar ﬁ nancial resources were not available 
for this purpose aft er 1990 in Hungary. In addition, there was another general 
heritage of the same gravity: the socialist industry and agriculture had been dom-
inated by low or medium-quality production, with limited marketability. 
Th e general gap in quality and marketability was partly due to the prior interna-
tional integration position of Hungary. From the 1960s on, the intra-state spe-
cialisation within the so-called Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) 
had been based on political logic, rather than on the principles of comparative 
advantages, and this fact distorted the product range of the Hungarian machine 
industry, food industry, light industry, pharmaceuticals production and other 
sectors employing a large number of people. Aft er the dissolution of the CMEA 
in 1990, the basis for the existence of various product cultures concerned simply 
disappeared. Products manufactured in compliance with Eastern standards and 
demand could not be economically placed on other external markets, while do-
mestic demand was not enough to maintain capacities. 
As far as quality problem is concerned, the roots could be found in the whole 
political and economic system. Already from the 1950s, operational disruptions 
indicated that the large-scale nationalised industry may have been suitable for 
manufacturing homogeneous products of mediocre quality in large volume, but 
it prevented ﬂ exibility, innovation and competitiveness. In Soviet-Russian con-
text, promotion of mass production may have had a modernising eﬀ ect, but this 
kind of production culture was a step backwards for Hungary. Meanwhile, in the 
light of “economic miracles” taking place in Western Europe, it became gradually 
apparent in Hungary and in other relatively developed Socialist countries that 
centralised planning was a kind of dead end. 
Th e “New Economic Mechanism (NEM)” of 1968, which extended state owned 
enterprise independence from state bureaucracy, was a reaction to the realisation 
above. NEM achieved some results: corporate management became more ﬂ exible 
and sensitive to demand. Th e symbiosis of big state-owned companies and small 
entrepreneurial units, something that later the Chinese introduced into their gov-
ernance models, led to the emergence of unusual hybrid forms, which became 
common mainly in some sectors of agriculture and services – as long as the big 
ﬁ rms existed. . However, at the very beginning of the 1990s, when the big state-
owned companies went bankrupt, were privatized or cut into smaller companies, 
the small proto-enterprises living in symbiosis with them oft en disappeared. 
Hungarian industrial production stopped growing already at the last stage of the 
planned economy due to the combined eﬀ ect of stricter external markets and 
the deterioration of competitiveness. As a reaction, the regime intended to give 
special treatment to the ﬁ ft y largest (and as such, politically sensitive) compa-
nies, as an early manifestation of the “too-big-to-fail” principle. Aft er the change 
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of regime, however, there was neither funding, nor intention to give preferential 
treatment to such a large part of the domestic economy. Due to international ob-
ligations, it was not even possible. 
Yet, in the light of the dynamics of Vietnam, China, both acting cautiously in 
developing market conditions, on the one hand, , and experiencing the deep drop 
in industrial production aft er 1990 in Hungary, on the other hand, the obvious 
question arises: would it not have been a better solution to give time for domestic 
enterprises for preparation and to slow down the opening up the markets? In 
order to answer this question, the macroeconomic relations need to be examined: 
the indebtedness of the state, the structural problems of the economy, as well as 
the constraining inﬂ uence of economic theory and economic ideology of the era.
2.2 When previous mistakes and debts surface
Th e most serious problem that rendered the return to the market economy system 
more diﬃ  cult and was in the focus of public debate in 1990 was the severe govern-
ment forex debt of Hungary, mainly to foreign creditors. In the case of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of Hungary, indebtedness in the currency of other countries (the 
“original sin” in the literature of development economics) had mostly been due 
to the fact that domestic saving was never enough to ﬁ nance the twin defi cits (the 
continuous government budget deﬁ cit and the current account deﬁ cit). 
Th e foreign trade deﬁ cit of the 1970s and 1980s was ﬁ nanced ﬁ rst by trade loans, 
then gradually by international bank loans and by issuing foreign currency 
bonds. In the late 1970s, however, the ﬁ nancial market conditions suddenly be-
came diﬃ  cult, which urged the Hungarian Communist party leadership to join 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. By accepting the condi-
tions of membership and promising further reforms, Hungary managed to re-
ceive additional resources from these organisations from 1982. At the same time, 
the process of debt accumulation continued. 
Prior to the free elections in 1990, the Communist government took measures to 
increase its popularity. For example, the foreign exchange touristic quota, which 
a lot of citizens used for the purpose of private import in the world of import re-
strictions, was raised. As a result, the foreign reserves of the country fell back to 
a critical level. By the time of the elections held in the spring of 1990, Hungary’s 
total foreign debt amounted to 16 billion euros (in present terms), compared to 
which the amount of foreign exchange reserves in convertible foreign currencies 
was merely EUR 875 million. Th is quantity was deﬁ nitely not enough, given that 
the stock of short-term (within one year) foreign currency debt was three times as 
high as the amount of the reserves. Consequently, the Antall government taking 
oﬃ  ce in 1990 had to rely heavily on the cooperation with the IMF and needed the 
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conﬁ dence of the international capital market very much. All this considerably 
restricted the leeway of the ﬁ rst freely elected government in economic policy 
aspects. 
It is understandable that given these diﬃ  culties in the beginning, the govern-
ment’s economic policy stance of punctual debt serving (aiming to avoid default) 
was hotly debated in public. In connection with external debt, the public has been 
and still is hostage to false narratives. Some people still condemn the Németh gov-
ernment (1988–89) and later the Antall government (1990–1993), for not copying 
the still ongoing restructuring negotiations of Poland, a country that declared 
default in 1982; in spite of the fact that both governments managed totally dif-
ferent legal and material conditions. Others expected that the West would write 
oﬀ  debts, taking into account the historical merits of Hungary. Another urban 
legend held that Hungary could have received debt reductions upon request. All 
these speculations were unfounded. Despite all the encouragement and general 
promises from western political circles, it became obvious soon that the countries 
of the region could not expect any comprehensive debt relief. Th e former planned 
economies, which were in a very diﬀ erent situation, had to ﬁ nd individual strat-
egies tailored to their own circumstances. Meanwhile, the number of transition 
countries multiplied due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and thus new 
players appeared on the scene. In order to facilitate their transition, the interna-
tional community established an international development bank (EBRD) and in-
creased the activity of the IMF in the area. In the case of Hungary, the internation-
al community did not even consider debt relief. Th e government was eager to avoid 
any manoeuvre that may have triggered sovereign default as such an event would 
have posed a serious risk to the initially successful and promising transition.
Th e misunderstandings and unfounded hopes hindered the debt management 
work of the Antall government, as they fed rumours about imminent debt re-
scheduling of Hungary, an otherwise solvent country, and the capital markets 
might have interpreted these noises as a sign of poor willingness to pay. Eventu-
ally, the Hungarian strategy of timely debt service turned out to be successful in 
the medium term. Th e government managed to tap foreign funds with longer 
duration and at lower interest rates, mobilized privatisation receipts and foreign 
direct investment (FDI), and this way the structure of the country’s external debt 
changed rapidly. In the meantime, the saving positions of Hungarian households 
improved signiﬁ cantly; the share of domestic saving, intermediated through the 
banking sector, increased in ﬁ nancing the budget deﬁ cit. At the time of the next 
parliamentary elections in 1994, foreign currency reserves of the National Bank of 
Hungary were already high enough to assuage any concern that ﬁ nancial markets 
might have had about the change of government: international reserves reached 
the level of EUR 5.4 billion, while short-term foreign debt remained under EUR 
2 billion. 
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Th e export capability of the economy was improving, current account concerns 
were easing. Over a decade, the country managed to overcome the hard period 
marked by external debt and internal public debt. So much so that, in the early 
2000s, at the time when the adoption of the euro was being considered for the ﬁ rst 
time, the only Maastricht criterion Hungary could have complied with was the 
public debt to GDP ratio (then 52). Th e signiﬁ cance of this can also be evaluated 
in the light of the fact that in 2018, this indicator was well over 70, in spite of 
the incoming EU transfers that amounted to several billions of euros year in, year 
out, unburdening the state budget.
At the same time, serious prior neglects and structural rigidities surfaced in the 
ﬁ rst years of the regime change. Th e former Reform-Socialist regime (1968–1989) 
relied on simulated, and not real, market competition, promising more rational 
and economical use of resources than under classical central planning, but in 
1990 it turned out that the heritage of the reformed Hungarian economy in terms 
of labour productivity, energy intensity, and capital eﬃ  ciency was not signiﬁ cant-
ly better than the legacy of Communist Czechoslovakia with strict central plan-
ning or the Polish economy that had been hit by several crises. At the moment of 
the opening of the market, the energy content of production was several times 
higher in the CEE region than in Western Europe. Th e somewhat better situation 
of Hungary was only due to the fact that the share of heavy industry had become 
smaller in Hungary by then. Owing to the termination of public subsidies and 
the transition to world market prices, suddenly energy became expensive for en-
terprises aft er 1990, and higher prices revealed the uncompetitiveness of several 
sectors. Despite the low wages in the region, given the poor eﬃ  ciency and pro-
ductivity of many state-owned and newly privatised companies, the competitive 
position of the new democracies, and Hungary was no exception, turned out to 
be worse than expected. 
Th e banking sector was one of the areas which failed to meet the expectations. In 
this ﬁ eld, Hungarian Reform-Socialism was more open than the countries of the 
region (except perhaps for Yugoslavia): in Hungary, the ﬁ rst joint-venture banks 
or completely foreign owned banks were allowed to appear in the 1980s. Prompt-
ed by the IMF and the World Bank, Hungary established (or more accurately: 
restored) two-tier banking system, and allowed the establishing of commercial 
banks already in 1986. Th e troublesome process of the restoration of the two-tier 
banking system will not be elaborated in this study, but some important eco-
nomic policy implications should be mentioned here. 
Th e troubles of the ﬁ nancial sector mainly derived from the four-decade-long 
planned economy system. Th e problems included the lack of suﬃ  cient expertise 
both on the part of banks and of clients, as well as the rudimentary and unsta-
ble nature of the legal framework. As a consequence, bankers tended to ignore 
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prudential aspects, and clients borrowed unthoughtfully. All this characterised 
mainly the initial years (1986–89). However, in a short time, due to the combined 
eﬀ ect of the market opening and the start of the privatisation process, the main 
problem was not the excessive funding allocation, but rather the fast deterioration 
of the quality of the existing loans. Th e foreign and joint-venture banks, estab-
lished in the framework of “greenﬁ eld” investment projects, canvassed their cli-
ents deliberately, but the state-owned credit institutions inherited their clientele, 
including mainly companies in public ownership, which got into trouble one aft er 
another owing to the loss of their principal markets and through mismanage-
ment. Loans to such clients tended to become nonperforming, which would have 
undermined the proﬁ tability and later the solvency of the banks even if they had 
been established with enough capital in the previous years. But they were not. 
Soon, banks which depended on clients with deteriorating situation had to face 
problems themselves. 
Decline in the lending capacity of Hungarian banking sector added to the head-
aches of economic policy makers because it deepened the unfolding recession. 
Th e volume index of the GDP shrank from 1990 on for four consecutive years. 
It reached its trough in 1993 with 82 of the level of 1989. Hungary’s cumulative 
contraction was about the same as that of Czechoslovakia and Poland. In the lat-
ter case, the recession began earlier and ended sooner. Among nations east and 
south of Hungary, transitional recession was even deeper, and it took more time 
to return to the GDP level achieved before the change of regime. Th e return to the 
base level took nearly a decade in Hungary - which is astounding. Th e surpris-
ingly intense output shrinkage is attributed to several factors. One of them is the 
ﬂ uctuating performance of the credit sector, which deﬁ nitely failed to meet the 
expectations. Th e negative eﬀ ect of the credit crunch on economy was even made 
worse because of the end of providing public subsidies. On the other hand, the 
inﬂ ow of foreign direct investment, which was the highest in Hungary in the re-
gion, helped the economy. It is, however, of note that at that time the CEE region, 
including Hungary, did not receive EU transfers unlike aft er 2004t, and in par-
ticular since the opening of the seven-year-long EU ﬁ nancial frameworks in 2007. 
Th e mounting problems of the banking sector indirectly inﬂ uenced later public 
deﬁ cit and debt ﬁ gures. In order to avoid the bankruptcy of undercapitalised state-
owned banks, they had to be recapitalised: the Hungarian government pumped 
budgetary funds into state-owned credit institutions between 1991 and 1994 to 
restore capital adequacy ratios under the so-called “bank consolidation”. For this 
purpose, a substantial amount of debt instruments had to be issued, which in-
creased the oﬃ  cial budget deﬁ cit and the stock of government debt. Despite the 
fact that these transactions did not increase macroeconomic demand, and budget 
statistics practices later acknowledged similar transactions as oﬀ -budget changes, 
in the 3-4 critical years of the change of regime, the transactions of the “debtor 
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and bank consolidation” appeared in the macroeconomic indicators of Hungary, 
signiﬁ cantly deteriorating them. 
Similarly, to the situation described above, banks have been bailed out and re-
capitalised in the developed world on several occasions since 2008. Yet, back in 
the 1990s, state intervention to maintain the operability of the ﬁ nancial interme-
diation was a more controversial issue. One of the reasons why bail-out of banks 
was less accepted in the 1990s than aft er the Great Crisis is the inﬂ uence of the 
economics and economic policy mainstream’ that in was much stronger at the 
time of transition.  
3 NARROW ELBOWROOM FOR NATION STATES 
AT THE PEAK OF GLOBALISATION
3.1 Reasons for the bigger-than-expected output decline
Everywhere in the CEE region, return to market economy proved to be more dif-
ﬁ cult than predicted by preliminary analyses, not to mention the expectations 
of the public. In the case of Hungary and other nations of Central and Eastern 
Europe, the historical detour lasted for four decades, while for the Russian soci-
ety, for seventy years. In the latter case, there were practically no adults alive who 
had personal experience with market economy. Moreover, the economic system 
to which the societies concerned returned aft er a several-decade-long hiatus was 
very diﬀ erent from the capitalism of the past. In the period prior to the change 
of regime, only those employed in foreign trade or in banking relationship with 
western partners, or those who studied or worked abroad could be familiar with 
the business life of the modern era. Th e number of such people was insigniﬁ cant 
in the Soviet Union, and it was low even in the relatively open socialist countries. 
Th e members of the foreign diaspora who returned to their home countries aft er 
the democratic change were those who could have brought home up-to-date mar-
ket knowledge or other kind of social capital. 
In the period prior to the change of regime, Hungary was in a relatively favour-
able position regarding external openness, in particular due to the western busi-
ness relations of its state-owned and (a few) private companies. In spite of this 
fact, the circle of widely travelled people remained limited. Th e Hungarian di-
aspora played only a tertiary role in the preparation and implementation of the 
change of regime, particularly in comparison with Poland. Based on their experi-
ence gained in the decades of reform socialism, the Hungarian economic agents 
knew somewhat more about monetary and commodity relations than the citizens 
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of countries with a prior rigid planned economy, but this advantage proved to be 
very relative. Th e “New Mechanism” of 1968 could not properly prepare Hungar-
ian society for real market operation, as the simulated market relations of the 
public sector and the particular ways and means of the second (or black) economy 
were very diﬀ erent from the norms of the modern and already completely glo-
balised market economy. 
As in the case of Czechoslovakia or Poland, a signiﬁ cant part of the Hungar-
ian elite that implemented the change of regime was recruited from intellectuals 
and from among middle and senior corporate management who decided to take 
part in public life. Th ese social groups were more familiar with the conditions 
of the new era and the demands of the external world but, of course, they were 
not fully prepared to solve the complex problems of the age. Compared to west-
ern countries with a diﬀ erent development path, actors with a labour union, civil 
society organisation or private business background were underrepresented in 
politics. Consequently, as far as political parties were concerned, there were no 
experienced second and third lines. Even on the central and local levels of state 
administration, there was a shortage of oﬃ  cials who could meet the requirements 
of modern civil service. 
In terms of the aspects listed above, Hungary was not lagging behind others, but 
did not have an advantage either. Th e professionality and eﬃ  ciency of public de-
cision-making obviously did not meet the unrealistically high expectations of the 
society. Public aﬀ airs had been politicised from the beginning, while the political 
class was divided by sharp political, cultural and emotional lines. As far as the 
democratic turn was concerned, all this threw cold water on the hopes of a sig-
niﬁ cant part of the society very soon. 
It is noteworthy, however, that the western community entertained excessive op-
timism at the time. Th e IMF, the European Commission, and the international 
organisations predicted that the transition would be much easier that it actually 
was. Th e V4 (later V3) countries lost one ﬁ  fth of their production in the ﬁ rst few 
years of the transition. Due to the greenﬁ eld investments, de novo private compa-
nies, and successfully privatised corporations and cooperatives, a new production 
structure was born, though more slowly than expected. Th e transition of agricul-
ture took even more time. When preparing its Polish and Hungarian loan pro-
grammes in 1990, the International Monetary Fund calculated with a transitional 
recession costing a few percent of GDP, but the contraction in the CEE region 
turned out to be triple rather than double of the percentage expected. 
Let us face it that the economic theory of transition has not been able to give a sin-
gle explanation for the reasons of the higher-than-expected transition contrac-
tion to date. Some experts query whether the oﬃ  cial statistical system measured 
the GDP prior to the transition to market economy well and whether statistics 
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registered the production and income processes taking place in the course of the 
fast transition properly. Th ere is no doubt that suﬃ  ciently reliable and timely na-
tional economic statistics have been available only since 1995. 
As far as the case of Hungary is concerned, the deep transitional downturn of 
the early 1990s was inﬂ uenced by a factor that also contributed to the similarly 
serous GDP fall (7 in one year) in 2009: the high level of external openness of the 
economy. In a highly open economy, growth can be much faster than the Euro-
pean average during boom years, but the contraction can be similarly deeper than 
the average during economic downturn. 
3.2 External economic policy advice
Although external openness is a plausible reason for above-average growth and 
volatility in the Hungarian case, the question arises: Why did the economy not 
display a growth aft er the transition crisis, at the time of favourable foreign boom 
as robust as the South Korean economy in the 1960s? In order to answer this 
question, we should deal with the economic orthodoxy of the 1990s and the con-
sequences of the so-call neoliberal economic policy. 
Th e “ten commandments” for economic policy known as the Washington Consen-
sus was essentially addressed to Latin American countries with populist tenden-
cies (Willamson, 1989). Yet, all former planned economies received the same “Pri-
vatise, deregulate and liberalise!” message from the international organisations, 
western governments and the majority of the academic community in the 1990s. 
Most external experts recommended determined and fast transition, though the 
shock therapy was known to cause seriously negative social impact. Still, it was 
considered to be better than the gradual, scheduled transition. As J. Sacks, a re-
nowned advocate of shock therapy, put it: the formula for success in the transition 
region is that the West should open up markets, provide (if required) debt relief 
and ﬁ nancial support to “new democracies”, which should immediately adopt the 
developed western institutional system in return (Sacks, 1990).
In fact, none of the above conditions were in fact fulﬁ lled. Th e western govern-
ments overrated the technological level of the Soviet Union and other planned 
economies and saw no reason to oﬀ er them serious ﬁ nancial support on top of 
IMF loans. Aft er the democratic turn, eastern companies paying low wages were 
thought to be price competitive. For this reason, and remembering previous cases 
of East European state dumping, the West did not want to establish an asymmet-
ric foreign trade regime that would have favoured the new democracies. 
Th e wrong assessment of the situation described above was reinforced by the 
ideology of the age. At the beginning of the 1990s, even temporary preservation 
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of public property, any form of public restructuring and market protection was 
almost unanimously rejected, not only by governments on the right in the Euro-
pean political scene but also by social democratic governments. Th e fast handover 
or, from the perspective of the other side, the immediate adoption of successful 
western legal and market institutions seemed to be enough, to make new market 
economies a success. Although some of us considered it to be naivety, a lot of 
experts seriously believed that the mere adoption of the institutional system was 
enough. Market fundamentalists believed that mutual opening of markets, the 
deﬁ nite removal of obstacles to entrepreneurship and adoption of the western 
institution together guarantee economic success. 
All this characterised the public opinion in the short period prior to the great dis-
appointment aft er the uniﬁ cation of Germany in late 1990 and the chaos caused 
by the Russian economic transition in 1991 and 1992. In a short time, the un-
expectedly heavy heritage of former planned economies, a drag on the regime 
change, and the real depth of the crisis started to surface. In his Nobel Price ac-
ceptance speech, D. North underlines that although formal economic institutions 
could be easily adopted, the transformation of non-formal institutions (customs, 
social norms, practices) took a long time. He admitted that privatisation was not 
a panacea for poor economic activity (North, 1993).
True, the policy of the IMF changed over time, the loan conditionality was not 
as rigid and did not adhere to a single standard anymore from the late 1990s on, 
partly due to the shift s in economic theory and thanks to the lessons learnt and 
popularized by the transitology literature which interpreted the speciﬁ cities of 
the region in scholarly manner. Yet, it took time for the world to understand the 
complexity of the tasks of the regime change.
3.3 A crisis period, growth in a new structure,
and the emergence of a dual economy
As mentioned, the statistically measured output of the Hungarian economy 
dropped to its lowest point in 1993, and it took years for the economy aft er 1989 
to return to the path of lasting growth. It is diﬃ  cult to compare Hungary with 
similar countries of the region, as the indices of the early years are slightly uncer-
tain. Since then, the statistical order has considerably changed, including FISIM, 
which was not accounted before 1995. Th e oﬃ  cial annual volume data of the Cen-
tral Statistics Oﬃ  ce and the indices calculated on the basis of such data reveal the 
depth of the crisis. Changes in the real GDP based on the year 1989: 1990: –3.5; 
1991: –12.1, 1992: –3.0, 1993: – 0.8; 1994: +3.1, 1995: +1.5, 1996: +0.2.
In the light of the above, the index started growing in the middle of the fourth 
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year, in 1993. Economic growth reappeared in a quite diﬀ erent structure from 
the earlier. However, owing to austerity measures, it ran out of steam from the 
second half of 1995 to 1996. Anyway, in 1996, the GDP was still 15 below the level 
of 1989. Th ese seven years should be considered to be the period of the transition 
crisis to be followed by a new economic period. Th e division applied in this study 
(1990–1996; 1997–) is diﬀ erent from those that follow political cycles, which links 
the new period to 1994 (election year) or the macroeconomic correction of 1995 
(the “Bokros Package”). Still, the years 1990 to 1996 should be treated as belonging 
to one period, for the characteristics of the structure of the economy, institution 
building phase and economic cycle. 
Th e assessment of the stabilisation package of 1995 has remained controversial. 
Some experts praise its balancing eﬀ ects, while others criticise it for slowing 
down the emerging growth. Th ere are also some who rather object to the neolib-
eral ideology associated with it, or refuse it because of its serious unfavourable so-
cial (and demographic) eﬀ ects. Th e aft erlife of the package is interesting, as well: 
in international literature, it is oft en referred to as a turning point and the start of 
the period of growth, even if it is not supported by output and investment data. 
But the elements of the package (currency devaluation, reduction of social spend-
ing, and the restart of privatisation) are measures which are easy to interpret in-
ternationally. Th e left -wing coalition in oﬃ  ce (1994–1998, 2002–2010) tended to 
regard the measures of 1995 as by and large correct, and the Left  considered the 
package to be the proof and symbol of its pro-market attitude. On the other hand, 
Fidesz, an opposition party at that time, deﬁ ned its own economic policy against 
the neoliberal direction embodied by the Bokros Package, especially aft er 2010. 
It is worth setting aside the question whether the neoliberal economic policy 
trend existed at all in Hungary in earnest or it was only talked about. In this study 
we claim that macroeconomic stabilisation of 1995 was part of the ﬁ rst phase, 
irrespective of political cycle. Certain ﬁ scal adjustment measures would have oc-
curred anyway, perhaps in a diﬀ erent form, under a diﬀ erent schedule and on a 
diﬀ erent ideological basis. Th is assumption is also supported by the economic 
trends in other transition countries. Th e transition crisis of the 1990s typically 
consisted of two stages in the CEE region: it started with a fall in general produc-
tion, while equilibrium indicators deteriorated: the budget deﬁ cit increased ow-
ing to a decrease in revenues and the surge of one-oﬀ  expenditure items triggered 
by the transformation. Inﬂ ation accelerated, as well. Consequently, in the second 
part of the transition crisis, macroeconomic stabilisation as an integral part of it, 
became necessary. 
However, its form was diﬀ erent in every country. For example, in the Polish tran-
sition, it was not the state budget that became a critical issue, as over the years of 
struggle, the welfare role of the state had decreased. Both public expenditures and 
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the current account deﬁ cit were lower than in Hungary, imbalance manifested 
itself rather in the runaway inﬂ ation. In 1993, the Polish złoty got redenominated 
by cutting four zeroes. In Hungary, the inﬂ ation was never as high as in Poland 
in that period. Th e Hungarian inﬂ ation reached its peak in 1991, then a period of 
disinﬂ ation followed until the end of 1994, when the headline rate dropped to 17. 
Later, due to the stabilisation package of 1995, the annual consumer price index 
approached 30 again, and then has gradually become a one-digit value. 
All currency functions of the forint remained preserved during the transition. 
Yet, it can be stated that price stability as an objective is not as deeply embedded 
in public awareness as, for example, in the Czech Republic. Th is is also true for 
ﬁ scal discipline: the Hungarian budget deﬁ cit ratio was higher than in the Czech 
Republic throughout the whole period examined. Th e volatility of the Hungarian 
deﬁ cit is especially conspicuous, as it follows the political cycles: the governments 
closed the election years with a high deﬁ cit in the ﬁ rst two decades. One of the 
implications of this was that the Hungarian state was placed under the EU’s excess 
defi cit procedure record long, until 2013. Since 2013, the deﬁ cit rate below 3 of the 
GDP has been almost the only ﬁ x economic indicator, even though the economic 
cycle has markedly changed. For a speciﬁ c political reason: the government tries 
to keep the deﬁ cit-to-GDP ratio below the EU limit so as to hold oﬀ  the European 
Commission. 
Considering the period between 1990 and 1996 as a single phase is also justiﬁ ed by 
the fact that the bulk of the radical change to the economic structure of Hungary 
took place in this period. Th e foreign literature regarded the Hungarian macro-
economic transition as gradual compared to the transition in the members of 
the Visegrád Group, the Baltic countries or Russia, accepting other governments’ 
declarations about their radical transition. But microeconomic data paint a dif-
ferent picture. Hungary excelled at the speed of structural transformation: data 
related to capital inﬂ ow, entrepreneurship, bankruptcy and liquidation laws, the 
change of the ﬁ nancial mediatory system, and the increase in labour productiv-
ity, it is clear that Hungary was in the forefront of structural and institutional 
transformation. In other countries, the modernisation of economic life happened 
with more compromise and hidden mistakes. For example, in the late 1990s, in 
the Czech economy, the harmful by-eﬀ ects of the voucher privatization scheme, 
especially the weaknesses of corporate governance, which played a role in the 
recession of 1997–98, came to the surface. In the early 2000s, Poland had to face 
inherited industry structural rigidities, similar to those that Hungary had already 
done away with a decade earlier. In the late 1990s, Slovakia was also hit by a be-
lated crisis due to privatisation policy or rather the lack of it. 
In comparison with the examples listed above, the structural modernisation of 
the Hungarian economy can be considered to be the most powerful. At the same 
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time, Hungary was the ﬁ rst state where the duality of the economy became clearly 
observable. On the one hand, there is a well-capitalised sector, dominated by for-
eign companies. On the other hand, the second sector is in Hungarian private 
ownership. Th e remaining companies are owned by the state. In the latter two 
categories (local small and publicly owned), labour productivity and capital ef-
ﬁ ciency are much lower. In fact, instead of duality, we should talk about an econ-
omy consisting of simultaneously operating fragments. 
4 ECONOMIC POLICY ROOM OF MANOEUVRE
OF A MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRY WITH SHARED SOVEREIGNTY
4.1  Privatisation and capital import as structural policy
Following the powerful shocks of the ﬁ rst decade, the Hungarian economy grew 
fast compared to its own potential. From 1997 to 2006, the GDP increased faster 
than the EU average, therefore Hungary moved closer to the countries considered 
to be the comparison standards. However, it was known that the growth rate was 
pushed above the natural growth rate by the indebtedness of the central govern-
ment, local governments, and households. Nevertheless, Hungary remained a 
middle-income economy, one with increased variance of its constituting factors 
behind the national statistical average. 
Th e national economy average obscures the aforementioned duality in economic 
structure, which the Hungarian public knows as the problem of multinational 
companies (despite the fact that the companies concerned may be businesses in 
foreign national ownership: German or Japanese car manufacturers, American 
electronics companies, a Swiss food industry concern or a Belgian bank). Th e 
so-called duality problem is due to the fact that intensive international capital 
ﬂ ows enlarged the activity and income gap between the central part of the coun-
try and the geographically (but rather infrastructurally) more remote regions of 
Hungary. 
Th is fact would have required strong regional development policy and the consid-
eration of the regional aspect in the distribution of public resources. Still, the ﬁ rst 
governments had not had serious ﬁ nancial power to do that, until the EU devel-
opment funds were multiplied aft er 2007. Regional development as an economic 
policy area was paid more attention temporarily when the authorities had to deal 
with the new nomenclature of territorial division (NUTS) in the framework of 
the preparation for the accession to the EU. Aft er this period, political interest in 
this area decreased, then the regional aspect was neglected altogether owing to 
the increasingly centralised character of economic policy. A ministry for regions 
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and regional development has been absent in the structure of government for a 
long time. Th e lack of professional government bodies with regional remit cannot 
be made up for by ad hoc Commissioners of the Prime Minister or by political 
promises about local developments made prior to the elections. 
On the other hand, one issue is always subject to the discourse about the economy 
and economic policy: the fate of small and medium-sized enterprises in Hungarian 
ownership. Th e weak job creation potential, the insuﬃ  cient investment activity, 
underdeveloped banking relations and frequent shortcomings in management in 
the SME sector has been a complex set of problem to date. Th ese are not speciﬁ -
cally Hungarian, either: being medium-developed asks for an for appropriate pol-
icy tailored to the special conditions of this sector. Th e eﬀ ort to create such policy 
has always been present in government programmes: privatisation loan, business 
starting loan facilities of the ﬁ rst period right aft er 1990; support to supplier pro-
grammes to ease entry of SMEs to value chain, the cluster concept, promotion of 
industrial parks, introduction of the cheap-loan Széchenyi Card at the end of the 
period. Competitiveness of SMEs was, over time, included into the priority pur-
poses of use of the EU funds. Yet, the mediocre eﬀ ectiveness of these programmes 
is still apparent even aft er three decades. Th e same applies to the implementation 
of industry or structural policy programmes, initiated time and again. 
As far as policy mixes are concerned, western economies tend to have a strong 
incomes policy. In his respect, Hungary is very diﬀ erent, although such neglect 
is rather general in the CEE region. Th e middle-income status is oft en associated 
with low and stagnating level of real wages and high corporate proﬁ t margin, or, 
to put is diﬀ erently, low wage share and high proﬁ t share of GDP. Low Hungar-
ian take-home wage rate has existed until recently, aggravating the positions of 
service-providing and producing SMEs through poor purchasing power of wage 
earners. Prior to Hungary’s accession to the EU, or even until 2011, the expiry 
of the labour market derogation requested by the older member states, limiting 
eﬀ ectively legal employment in the West, the domestic wage rate, a fraction of 
that of the European average, had not led to the mass migration of Hungarian 
labour to foreign countries. Until then, the more likely social options to counter 
depressed domestic wages and salaries were early retirement or sinking into the 
second (informal) economy. Th e Hungarian inactivity rate got stuck at a high lev-
el until the beginning of the second decade of the transition, in spite of impressive 
economic growth, which can be identiﬁ ed as a serious economic policy mistake: 
during the expansion, lasting until 2006, there would have been a good chance of 
increasing employment activity. 
Th e turn in labour policy aft er 2010 can also be interpreted as a response to earlier 
policy mistakes. Its elements included government measures against early retire-
ment, the extension of the public work programme and placing it under the super-
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vision of the Ministry of Interior. Due to the programme, the Hungarian employ-
ment data have signiﬁ cantly improved. Concerning real employment, the picture 
is more complex. One of the promises of the public work programme was that it 
would give people a chance to return to the world of value-creating work from in-
activity. It has not come true yet. Th e social policy critics of the programme claim 
that the extension of the institution of public work serves the centralised control 
of disadvantaged social groups that live without permanent income, mainly in 
the countryside. It is no coincidence that the 2018 country-speciﬁ c recommenda-
tions of the European Commission include the reorganisation of the public work 
programme, in order to unlock labour reserves through improving the quality of 
active labour market policies so that public workers could return to the genuine 
labour market. 
Th e regulation of the world of work, the amendments to the Labour Code in 2012 
and the reregulation of overtime at the end of 2018, which evoked great social 
resistance, were reactions to the needs of the economic structure that had been 
established in the ﬁ rst half of the period analysed in this study: a structure in 
which technology and capital of western ﬁ rms are combined with the available 
qualiﬁ ed, an inexpensive, labour force. Due to the absorption of labour reserves 
and the acceleration of employment outﬂ ow to the West, it is increasingly diﬃ  cult 
to maintain the production and growth dynamics within the given structure: this 
issue will be one of the most diﬃ  cult challenges of the following years.
4.2 Spending the EU funds as structural and business cycle policy
With the advance of the transition, the eﬀ ect of external constraints has not weak-
ened at all. Nowadays, national economic policy is not limited by the IMF loan 
conditionality anymore (except in moments when a country’s liquidity becomes 
unstable, like in Hungary, in 2008). It is rather the existence of international 
conventions and membership in integration arrangements that delimit national 
structural polices such as aiming at supporting local businesses or developing 
sectors and areas. Being party to conventions and club memberships can be seen 
as voluntary self-restraint by the nation state in order to promote its long-term 
goals. Yet, the government of the day might feel the limitation of its freedom to 
make decisions at will. In 1996, joining the OECD was an important milestone 
for Hungarian economic policy. As a result, the companies from OECD members 
are treated the same way as domestic companies, in return for similarly fair treat-
ment for Hungarian ﬁ rms abroad. Still, the entry also narrowed down the leeway 
for structural policies of the nation state. 
Th e candidate status and later the full membership in EU brought about even 
stricter rules. Th e convergence policies (earlier: structural policies, later: cohesion 
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policies) are shaped jointly by the EU institutions and the governments of the 
Member States. As far as the implementation is concerned, national institutions 
are given a relatively free hand. Yet, the huge EU funds with their spending terms 
and rules of use exert a strong external inﬂ uence on Hungarian economic policy. 
Providing direct state aid for domestic ﬁ rms (potential “national champions”) is 
incompatible with the EU norms, any such attempt will infringe competition rules 
and the ban on state aid, as the high number of infringement procedures against 
the Hungarian government indicate. On the other hand, most programmes sup-
porting Hungarian SMEs are compatible with the EU norms. Th eir successful 
implementation depends much more on the administrative and planning abilities 
of the Hungarian institutions than on external legal-institutional factors.
Th e net amount of funds ﬂ owing in from the EU has had (and will have if the size 
of the funds remains the same) a very powerful eﬀ ect on the equilibrium indica-
tors of the Hungarian economy. In the second half of the period, the annually 
absorbed forex funds (3 of the GDP on average) accelerated the dry-up of net 
foreign debt, strengthened the central budget and stabilised agribusiness incomes 
at a high level. Th ey considerably increased the aggregate demand, which signiﬁ -
cantly contributed to closing the negative output gap of the economy, especially 
aft er 2008. However, it is still not clear how the EU funds (the programmes of the 
CAP and the cohesion policy) impact the supply side of the economy and to what 
degree they will enhance the growth potential in the future. 
4.3 Sovereignty and elbowroom of the government
Over the three-decade period examined, the ﬁ nancial crisis of 2008 brought a 
critical turn for Europe and for Hungary, as well. As a result, the wave of globali-
sation unfolding in the 1980s slowed down. Th e possible economic policy paths of 
the former planned economies had been strongly determined by external condi-
tions in the 1990s, then the simultaneous expansion and deepening of the Euro-
pean integration had much limited the leeway for the governments of small, open 
market economies – but now the crisis created a new situation. In Hungary, the 
country’s high external exposure came to the surface, forcing the government of 
the day (Socialists – Liberals) to turn to IMF and the EU for ﬁ nancial support in 
2008. However, interestingly, aft er the short-lived ﬁ nancial crisis, much greater 
leeway opened up for countries going their own ways. 
In fact, the commonplace statement about nation states losing their signiﬁ cance 
in the globalised world was oversold even before 2008. Th e dominant private sec-
tor of the market economy is certainly closely integrated into the external world, 
and the private sectors of countries with a smaller internal market have especially 
high external exposure, but the public sector of a mixed economy is also large and 
HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC POLICY BETWEEN 1989 AND 2019 37
is closely tied to local politics. Budgetary expenditures generally amount to half of 
the GDP in European states. Moreover, most EU transfers run through the states 
and thus can become the means of economic policy making. Th us, states matter.
Th e degree of freedom of the Member States manifested itself in the ﬁ nancial 
crisis of 2008 and the Eurozone crisis of 2010. Some European core states, led 
by Germany, called for ﬁ nancial stabilisation, while other states on the periph-
ery could not take or did not wish to take this path. Th e self-assessment of the 
Hungarian economic policy line aft er 2010 is that is diﬀ ers knowingly from the 
orthodoxy of Western European economic policy, referring to its policies as “un-
orthodox”. 
Th e turn for national, unconventional policy line was neither unique, nor surpris-
ing. Most success stories in economic development are known to have been born 
as a result of original strategies, like in the earlier modernisation cases in Asia. 
Of course, the former success cases cannot be copied elsewhere as they took place 
at a diﬀ erent development level, in a diﬀ erent cultural context than the one that 
characterised the Central and Eastern European countries at the historic moment 
of the regime change. At the end of the 20th century, none of the CEE countries 
could have chosen the developmental state modernisation path of Asia. Yet they 
enjoyed a certain, albeit limited, degree of freedom in the sense that any nation 
had the opportunity to choose individual adaptation technique to join the glo-
balisation process. 
As their attitude to monetary sovereignty shows, even the countries of the rela-
tively homogeneous V4 Group followed diﬀ erent strategies: Slovakia joined the 
Eurozone early, while the other three countries have retained national currency. 
Th ere are strong business and economic arguments for joining the Eurozone; the 
counterarguments are rather of monetary policy-related, but the pure political 
aspect of sovereignty is known to be just as decisive. As the case of the European 
banking union indicated, whether a country joins it or not cannot be clearly de-
duced from economic rationality; this is why certain countries (e.g. Romania) 
wish to join, while other countries (e.g. Hungary) do not: the choice is determined 
by the speciﬁ c political considerations of the political parties in power.
4.4 Unorthodox economic policy path aft er the crisis
Th e content analysis of the Hungarian economic policy practice, which is diﬀ er-
ent from the declarations and oﬃ  cial statements of the governments concerned, 
clearly contains individual features in the successive phases. Such characteristics 
distinguish the Hungarian practice from the dominant trend (orthodoxy) of the 
era but also from the actual course of other countries in similar situation. At the 
same time, general trends are still observable, because the Hungarian practice is 
inﬂ uenced by various similar eﬀ ects. 
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Th is study does not allow a proper overview of the various stages, and particularly 
the detailed analysis of the policy mixture of successive governments. Otherwise, 
diﬀ erent stages can be distinguished even within a given political cycle: the de-
termined initial institution-building eﬀ orts of the Antall government were moti-
vated by their commitment to the German-inspired social market economy model 
but from the middle of the election cycle, policy makers were rather bogged down 
in crisis management due to the evolving structural crisis. Similarly, the Horn 
government (1994–1998) implemented, aft er initial hesitation, macro-stabilisation 
measures and launched extensive privatisation including even public utilities (the 
majority of the latter were renationalised aft er 2010), but approaching the elec-
tions, it changed course by starting a ﬁ scal expansion. Having regard to the global 
economic turbulences of 1998, the ﬁ rst Orbán government (1998–2002) started its 
work with fi scally conservative policy, then in mid-cycle, it negotiated a sharp turn 
towards supply side measures along with loose ﬁ scal and monetary policy stance. 
Such or similar switches between stages have been frequent throughout the whole 
period. Th ey partly reﬂ ect the intention of the political leadership (easing of ﬁ scal 
policy prior to the elections), while in other cases, they occur as the consequences 
of external constraints and eﬀ ects. Such a sharp turn took place in the summer 
of 2006 when fed up with Hungary’s multiple infringements of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, the European Council put an end to the proﬂ igate government pol-
icy that had led to high budgetary deﬁ cit in Hungary. Tightening and soft ening of 
EU rules tended to follow a certain cyclical pattern that sometimes clashed with, 
other times strengthened the Hungarian business-governmental cycle. 
Another external factor of cyclicality in the Hungarian case has been the inﬂ ux 
of EU funds. Th is factor is fairly volatile for technical and administrative reasons; 
therefore it may cause intense swings in aggregate demand. As far as the con-
tribution of EU funds to the aggregate supply is concerned, there is not enough 
available information. However, the weakness of the absorptive capacity of the 
Hungarian economy, phenomena of overpricing in the spending of EU funds, 
the campaign-like character of the use of convergence funds, and the frequently 
changing administrative background deﬁ nitely worsen the eﬃ  ciency of the use 
of EU resources. 
Th e period aft er 2008 facilitated the pursuit of unorthodox economic policies in 
countries with limited external ﬁ nancial dependence or where restraints eased 
over time. Th e latter happened in Hungary, owing to the one-way eﬀ ect of multi-
ple factors. As for one, foreign trade balance had, by 2009, turned into massive ex-
port surplus. Aft er 2007, more and more EU funds ﬂ owed into the country, then 
remittances by Hungarian citizens working abroad also increased signiﬁ cantly. 
Due to the facts listed above, net foreign debt would have fallen even without 
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special measures. Th e ﬁ scal policy, as well as the monetary policy and banking 
regulation only intensiﬁ ed the process of lessened external exposure. 
Aft er 2010, announcing its policy aim to regain sovereignty, the Hungarian gov-
ernment started looking for new paths also in economic policy making. One of 
its motives must have been the realisation that the income convergence expecta-
tions of a large part of the society had not been met, and the need for security had 
become stronger. Emphasising national interest and stepping up against the EU 
institutions, the IMF and the representatives of international capital have proven 
to be politically successful, even though a major part of the society is aware of the 
beneﬁ ts arising from Hungary’s EU membership. As the ﬁ nancial crisis and the 
subsequent harsh years made a lot of people regard the whole process of the re-
gime change as a failure, a critical attitude to the Western socio-economic model 
can be communicated well to a wide range of social groups.
In the second part of the examined period, the growth and convergence perfor-
mance of the Hungarian economy was modest within the region. Th is is despite 
very favourable international circumstances: historically low international inter-
est rate, improving international terms of trade, considerable transfer income 
from the European Union, and most of all, the pulling eﬀ ect of the Central Eu-
ropean Area, which is very important for Hungarian export. However, some fac-
tors withheld the dynamics. Th e fact that is especially striking compared to other 
countries in the area: the income share subtracted by the Hungarian state. Th e cen-
tralisation rate approaches, or in some cases, even exceeds the ratio of advanced 
continental welfare states, and is much higher than in middle-income European 
countries. 
Economic agents, especially foreign players ﬁ nd the unorthodox economic policy 
decisions, in particular the ad hoc measures, hard to follow; this is reﬂ ected in 
Hungary’s sovereign risk ratings. As the assessment issued by Fitch in the spring 
of 2018 puts it: questions about the credibility of the economic policy course and 
the unpredictable measures deteriorate the rating based on model calculations 
(BBB+), therefore Hungary’s sovereign risk rating is only BBB–. Measures aim-
ing to beef up domestic entrepreneurial class may infringe EU competition law 
and general EU laws. Th e European cooperation may take a direction that would 
open up a wider path for individual national policies, simply accepting the diverse 
national programmes that emerged aft er the ﬁ nancial crisis, but European politi-
cal dynamics may evolve into the very opposite: closer cooperation in taxation 
policy and social regimes, as well giving growing weight to institutions linked to 
the Eurozone. Should that happen. economic risks arising from following own 
national paths. 
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5  CONCLUSIONS
Th e radical political changes of 1989/1990 and the similarly turbulent events of 
2019 provide a unique timeframe for the whole of Europe, including Hungary. In 
the light of the above, it is diﬃ  cult to detect the national characteristics and iden-
tify the internal tendencies of the Hungarian economic policy and distinguish the 
external determining factors which led to the events. 
At the beginning of the period, economic policy eﬀ orts were directed towards 
an insuﬃ  ciently monetised, extensively industrialised economy ﬁ ghting against 
various imbalances. At the end of the period, a developed market economy in a 
much better situation provides the framework for economic policy actions. At the 
initial stage, the dominant intention was to return irrevocably to the former main 
markets and to internalize the Western institutional and political system, and 
all chapters in the policy mix were subordinated to this goal. Th e informational, 
institutional and political conditions of economic policy-making have changed 
very fast: initially, policies had to be deﬁ ned and implemented in the midst of 
extreme uncertainty. By now, the Hungarian informational order is mostly com-
pliant with the EU nomenclature and methodology. 
by the middle of the ﬁ rst decade of transition, the internal institutional order 
successfully evolved, private ownership became dominant, and Hungary became 
convincingly anchored to the West in security and trade policy. Meanwhile, great 
structural transformations in productive sectors had been accomplished, , pro-
duction cultures which provided a character to the Hungarian economy in terms 
of output, export and employment were born by the end of the decade. In the 
era of a high degree of openness in foreign trade and ﬁ nances, the dilemma of 
Hungarian economic policy (growth and/or balance), which seems to be eternal, 
had lost its previous relevance. For some time, it looked that by being integrated 
into western value chains and by complying with EU norms and decision-making 
rules, national economic policy might fade into a secondary risk factor, and there 
is no reason to question the continuous and perceptible progress of income con-
vergence, so much hoped for by the society. 
Yet, one cannot but notice that several old problems still exist. Such problems in-
clude the tendency for inﬂ ation and budgetary deﬁ cit, the long-lasting weakness 
of the regional and interprofessional mobility of the labour force, the wide social 
acceptance of, and even the demand for, paternalism. In the years prior to the 
ﬁ nancial crisis, imbalances developed again. As a result, Hungary, as a member 
of the OECD and the EU, had to turn to the IMF again aft er many years; true, 
being not the only country from the periphery of Europe to do so. By this move, 
the government had to accept the limitation of its decision-making sovereignty in 
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an era when the disturbances in the European project resulted in strengthening 
national rhetoric and turning to heterodox solutions. 
Concerning the operation of Hungary’s ﬁ nancial markets, the three decades 
consisted of various sub-periods and processes were interrupted by various turn-
ing points. Despite having some years of advantage in the beginning over other 
nations in the CEE region, the Hungarian ﬁ nancial system was unable to avoid 
shocks, bank failures and scandals in the 1990s. Similarly, to the banking sys-
tem of other former socialist countries, the majority of the Hungarian ﬁ nancial 
system also got into foreign ownership. Regarding ﬁ nancial depth, at the end of 
the period, together with other nations with similar background, Hungary is still 
lagging behind the EU average, though the banking system has become more 
shock-proof since the crisis. Th e dream that Budapest may develop into an out-
standing regional ﬁ nancial hub has not been fulﬁ lled. Due to the (also) politi-
cally motivated infrastructure development projects and mainly to Hungary’s 
economic-geographical position, the country has a better chance of becoming a 
logistics centre, instead.
In the absence of well-considered structural programmes with suﬃ  cient ﬁ nancial 
support, the structure of the economy has been formed mainly by EU accession 
programmes and aid schemes, as well as by capital importing deals. Th e processes 
of digitalisation and automation have a powerful endangering and potentially en-
riching eﬀ ect on this production structure. Th e following years will tell us how 
the Hungarian economy manages to beneﬁ t from the changes that also provide 
new opportunities. Another question of the future is how the social and regional 
policy, the R&D policy, education and the institutional order serving social inclu-
sion will react to the widening regional and social inequalities and the already 
visible shortcomings of the accumulation of human capital. 
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